University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Honors Theses (PPE)

Philosophy, Politics and Economics

8-10-2010

Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and
Limitations of the Grameen Bank
Ana Maria Moreno

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Income Distribution
Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, International Economics Commons, Other Economics
Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons

Moreno, Ana Maria, "Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and Limitations of the
Grameen Bank" (2010). Honors Theses (PPE). Paper 17.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors/17
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and Limitations of the
Grameen Bank
Abstract
The Grameen Bank has attracted worldwide attention by providing small loans to poor people across rural
villages in Bangladesh. In 2006 the Nobel Committee awarded the Grameen Bank and its founder
Professor Mohammad Yunus the Nobel Peace Prize for their, “efforts to create economic and social
development from below.”[1] The Nobel committee asserted that microfinance is “an important liberating
force and an ever more important instrument in the struggle against poverty.”[2] Since then, a global
microfinance revolution has emerged and the Grameen Bank has been at the vanguard of this movement,
showing the potential to alleviate poverty by providing credit to poor households so that they can
generate new self-employment opportunities.
Today, while diverse approaches to microcredit exist many view the Grameen Bank’s microfinance model
as a paradigmatic alternative to top–down government-sponsored and NGO development initiatives.[3]
Despite the contemporary salience and the future promise of Grameen-like microfinance as a povertyalleviating tool, however, criticisms and conflicting evidence have emerged against the Grameen Bank’s
microfinance model and its operations. As more microfinance institutions replicate this model, billions of
dollars continue to be invested and millions of borrowers become dependent on Grameen-like
microfinance, therefore, it has become increasingly important to examine the successes and limitations
of the Grameen Bank.
The goal of this paper will be to evaluate the Grameen Bank’s financial and social successes and
limitations. Chapter 1 explores the origins of the Grameen Bank and the structure of its credit delivery
system. Chapter 2 examines the Grameen Bank’s financial successes, including its institutional, outreach
and loan portfolio growth in recent years. Chapter 3 presents the financial limitations of the Grameen
Bank, in particular the recent rise in delinquency, several possible explanations for this rise as well as its
significance relative to its main competitors and other microfinance institutions around the world.
Chapter 4 presents the Grameen Bank’s social successes and limitations and finally Chapter 5 evaluates
whether the Grameen Bank has been financially and socially successful as an institution and as a leader
in the global microfinance movement.
[1] "The Nobel Peace Prize 2006". Nobelprize.org. 23 Jul 2010 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2006/
[2] "Prof. Muhammad Yunus & Grameen Bank Awarded The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006." Grameen Bank.
Web. 15 July 2010. .
[3] Selinger, Evan. Does Microcredit ‘‘Empower’’? Reflections on the Grameen Bank Debate. Rep. Springer
Science+Business Media, 23 Jan. 2008. Web. .
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Introduction
The Grameen Bank has attracted worldwide attention by providing small loans to poor people
across rural villages in Bangladesh. In 2006 the Nobel Committee awarded the Grameen Bank
and its founder Professor Mohammad Yunus the Nobel Peace Prize for their, “efforts to create
economic and social development from below.”

1

The Nobel committee asserted that

microfinance is “an important liberating force and an ever more important instrument in the
struggle against poverty.”2 Since then, a global microfinance revolution has emerged and the
Grameen Bank has been at the vanguard of this movement, showing the potential to alleviate
poverty by providing credit to poor households so that they can generate new self-employment
opportunities.
Today, while diverse approaches to microcredit exist many view the Grameen Bank’s
microfinance model as a paradigmatic alternative to top–down government-sponsored and NGO
development initiatives.3 Despite the contemporary salience and the future promise of Grameenlike microfinance as a poverty-alleviating tool, however, criticisms and conflicting evidence
have emerged against the Grameen Bank’s microfinance model and its operations. As more
microfinance institutions replicate this model, billions of dollars continue to be invested and
millions of borrowers become dependent on Grameen-like microfinance, therefore, it has
become increasingly important to examine the successes and limitations of the Grameen Bank.

1

"The Nobel Peace Prize 2006". Nobelprize.org. 23 Jul 2010 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/

2

"Prof. Muhammad Yunus & Grameen Bank Awarded The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006." Grameen Bank. Web. 15 July 2010.
<http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12>.
3

Selinger, Evan. Does Microcredit ‘‘Empower’’? Reﬂections on the Grameen Bank Debate. Rep. Springer Science+Business
Media, 23 Jan. 2008. Web. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/fpm5220tv31h1127/fulltext.pdf>.
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The goal of this paper will be to evaluate the Grameen Bank’s financial and social successes and
limitations. Chapter 1 explores the origins of the Grameen Bank and the structure of its credit
delivery system. Chapter 2 examines the Grameen Bank’s financial successes, including its
institutional, outreach and loan portfolio growth in recent years. Chapter 3 presents the financial
limitations of the Grameen Bank, in particular the recent rise in delinquency, several possible
explanations for this rise as well as its significance relative to its main competitors and other
microfinance institutions around the world. Chapter 4 presents the Grameen Bank’s social
successes and limitations and finally Chapter 5 evaluates whether the Grameen Bank has been
financially and socially successful as an institution and as a leader in the global microfinance
movement.
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Chapter 1: The Origins of the Grameen Bank
The Grameen Bank and the Beginnings of Microfinance
Access to credit can significantly change the lives of the poor because it provides them with an
opportunity to invest in self-employment actives and as a result increase their household incomes,
build assets and reduce their vulnerability to crises. Furthermore, access to credit also has the
potential to empower and equip the poor to make their own choices and build their way out of
poverty in a sustained and self-determined way. Finally, it can also make women better able to
confront gender inequities and ultimately allow them to plan for their future and to invest in their
own and their families’ health and education.
Given the significant benefits that access to credit can have on the lives of the poor, before
institutional credit for the poor was introduced in Bangladesh scarce access to credit inhibited the
rural poor’s ability to escape the poverty cycle. Prior to the emergence of the Grameen Bank and
microfinance, commercial banks and moneylenders were the primarily sources of credit available
in rural Bangladesh, yet both perpetuated the poverty trap.4 On the one hand, commercial banks
shunned the poor because they were unable to provide collateral, while on the other hand local
money lenders engaged in extortionary practices, such as charging excessively high rates of
interests that consumed nearly all of their profits.
In 1974 the impetus that led to the establishment of the Grameen Bank and its microfinance
model aimed at providing credit to poor households so that they can generate self-employment
opportunities emerged during a drought and famine, which killed 1.5 million people in

4

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh: an Anthropological Study of the Rhetoric and Realities of
Grameen Bank Lending. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001. Print. p 4.
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Bangladesh. 5 During the drought, Professor Muhammad Yunus visited the Bangladeshi rural
village of Jobra and observed how the poor were struggling to escape the poverty trap due to
their inability to obtain affordable credit. In particular, Yunus attributes the origin of his vision of
microfinance to an encounter in Jobra with Sufia Begum, a 21-year-old woman who had
borrowed about 25 cents from moneylenders charging interest rates of approximately 10% per
day based on the current exchange rates. Ms. Begum used the money she borrowed to make
bamboo stools that she was then forced to sell back to the moneylender at a price below market
value for a profit of approximately 2 cents.6
Growing increasingly frustrated at his inability to help the poor, Yunus pioneered the idea of
microcredit by providing small loans to poor people in rural villages in Bangladesh. In 1976 he
experimented by lending small amounts of money at reasonable interest rates to 42 people in
Jobra. He lent a total of $27 (about 62 cents per borrower) and to his surprise the borrowers paid
him back in full and on time.7 Then, with the financial assistance of the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) Yunus extended his lending project nationally and travelled
from village to village, offering small loans.8 From his experience travelling around Bangladesh,
Yunus realized that making institutional credit available to the poor could serve as a powerful
poverty alleviation tool.9 Consequently, he approached traditional banks and proposed that they

5Mainsah,

Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor.
Publication. Columbia Business School, 2004. Web.
<http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/848/Grameen_Bank_v04.pdf>.p2.
6

Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p2.

7

Giridharadas, Anand, and Keith Bradsher. "Microloan Pioneer and His Bank Win Nobel Peace Prize." The New York Times.
Web. 29 May 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/business/14nobelcnd.html?_r=1>.
8

9

Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.3.

Yunus, Muhammad. Banker to the Poor: micro-lending and the battle against world poverty. New York: Public Affairs hc.
p. 46–49.
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should make uncollateralized loans to poor people in rural villages. Despite Yunus’ conviction
that the poor would repay their loans if given the opportunity, however, traditional banks were
not interested in making small loans to them. They asserted that poor borrowers would “never
sufficiently organize themselves to repay, that proceeds from such loans were too small to cover
administrative costs, that female borrowers would simply hand over the funds to their husbands
and that the poor were incapable of successfully managing an added burden of indebtedness.”10
In 1976 Yunus responded to the challenges posed by conventional banks and rejecting the basic
methodology of conventional banking, which excluded the poor by classifying them as “not
creditworthy,” he established the Grameen Bank. Yunus developed a microfinance model using
rules of lending that were tailored to the poor’s circumstances and extended access to credit to
the rural poor using this model.11 Today, three decades later, the Grameen Bank’s microcredit
model serves as an alternative approach to conventional poverty alleviation strategies and it is
aimed at providing microcredit and organizational input to those who would otherwise be
excluded from the formal financial system.
Grameen’s Credit Delivery System
According to Yunus the following are several distinctive features of the Grameen Bank:


Targets the Poorest of the Poor and Focuses on Women



Group, Collateral-free lending



Rural Banking

10

Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.3.

11

Giridharadas, Anand, and Keith Bradsher. "Microloan Pioneer and His Bank Win Nobel Peace Prize."
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Targets the Poorest of the Poor and Focuses on Women
According to Professor Yunus, the Grameen Bank targets the poorest of the poor, with a
particular emphasis on women, who receive 95% of the bank’s loans. The explicit criterion for
individuals to be eligible for Grameen microcredit loans is “landlessness.” 12 For instance,
borrowers are eligible to obtain loan if they come from households, “owning less than 0.5 acres
of cultivable land” or from households in which “total assets do not exceed the value of one acre
of medium quality, single-cropped land in that area.”13

Group, Collateral-free Lending
Grameen Bank offers loans for creating self-employment for income-generating activities and
housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption. It extends credit to the poor to invest in
productive areas, such as processing and manufacturing, agriculture and forestry, livestock and
fisheries, services and trade.14
Furthermore, the following are other important features of the Grameen Bank’s lending practices:
 Multiple Loans: Borrowers can take out more than one loan simultaneously.
 Loan Amounts: Loans start at $35 and average $200, depending on the needs of the
borrowers and their level of credit, which is determined by previous borrowing and their
repayment record.
 Repayment: Borrowers pay back their loans in installments (weekly or bi-weekly) and
pay interest depending on the loan type.

12

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5.

13

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5.
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 Interest Rates: There are four interest rates for loans from Grameen Bank: 20% for
income generating loans, 8% for housing loans, 5% for student loans, and 0% (interestfree) loans for Struggling Members (beggars).
 Collateral-Free Lending: The Grameen Bank does not require any collateral against its
microloans, but instead it provides credit to the poorest of the poor on group basis. Hence,
it replaces conventional requirement of physical collateral with group responsibility
where group performance determines continued access to credit.15
 Group Lending: The Grameen Bank has developed its own credit delivery system to
overcome problems of asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement by having
borrowers take out loans in self-selected groups of five rather than individually. 16 The
purpose of the group lending structure is so that the other borrowers monitor and
guarantee each other’s debts to the extent that one member defaulting will deprive others
of future loans. Hence, while there is no group liability in the sense that repayment
responsibility rests solely on the individual borrowers, the group lending structure forces
members to be socially and economically accountable to each other, thereby creating
pressure among group members to monitor each other and screen out bad borrowers.17
-Several advantages of the group-lending approach, therefore, are that it uses peer
pressure to monitor and enforce contracts, it provides an incentive structure for the
borrowers to repay and it helps screen good borrowers from bad ones.18

15

Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995. Print. p.4
16

Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.x

17

Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.x

18

Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.5.
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Rural Banking
Grameen operates in 81,355 villages across Bangladesh.19 Based on the principle that the bank
should go to the people, it has developed a client-centered delivery system in which bank
workers go to the poor to collect their weekly installments and disburse new loans. 20
Furthermore, to facilitate the expansive provision of microfinance loans across rural Bangladesh,
the Grameen Bank credit delivery system is decentralized and hierarchical. Its administrative
structure consists of four tiers - the head office, the zonal offices, the area offices and the
branches- with a distinctive set of functions for each.21
FIGURE 1.1 The Hierarchical Structure of Grassroots Grameen Bank Micro-Lending

19

"Historical Data Series in USD." Grameen Bank. May 2010. Web. 20 Feb. 2010. <http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=177&Itemid=503>.
20

Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.5.

21

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5.
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As illustrated by Figure 1.1 at the bottom of the hierarchical structure is the Loan Group
consisting of five individual borrowers per group. The group system represents the first level of
regulation since loan groups are overseen by a group chairperson who is responsible for
maintaining group discipline in weekly meetings, conducting weekly transactions with the bank
workers and proposing loans on behalf of other group members.22
At the second level of regulation is the Loan Center. Six to eight loan groups form a Loan Center
and each loan center is overseen by a loan center manager who “visits borrowers regularly to
monitor loan payments and plays a large role in selecting borrowers, approving lending groups
and supervising income-generating projects.” 23
Then, as an added risk-management measure, several loan centers are overseen at the Bank
Branch level. The branch is “the most important unit in Grameen Bank operations since it
is the field-level office with the most contact with its member-borrowers and the basic profitmaking unit.”24 A typical branch supervises 50-60 centers located in villages within walking
distance of the branch and it is responsible for group formation, member training and loan
supervision. 25 Furthermore, each of the Grameen Bank’s 2562 branches is run by a branch
manager and several center managers.
Finally, several branch offices are supervised by an area manager and program officer at the area
office and they have the ultimate authority to make decisions about individual loans.

22

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5.

23

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5.

24

Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5.

25Khandke,

Shahidur, Baqui Khalily, and Zahed Khan. Is the Grameen Bank Sustainable? p. 6.
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Strategy, Risk Management, Growth and Compensation
FIGURE 1.2. Summary of Grameen Bank’s Strategy, Risk Management, Growth and Compensation

Moreno, 15

Chapter 2: Financial Successes of the Grameen Bank
The Grameen Bank’s successes and limitations can be measured in terms of both social and
financial standards. Financially, according to the Grameen Bank’s financial statements since
2002 the Grameen Bank has experienced significant institutional, outreach and loan
disbursement growth.
Institutional Growth
As illustrated by Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 Grameen experienced high institutional growth since
2002. In particular, there has been a significant increase in the Grameen Bank’s number of
employees, number of offices and total assets.

Figure 2.1 Source- Grameen Bank
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Figure 2.2 Source- Grameen Bank

Figure 2.3: Source- Grameen Bank
Bank
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Outreach Growth
The Grameen Bank’s has also experienced significant outreach growth since 2002.26 As shown
by Figure 2.4 there has been growth in the number of members, the number of active borrowers,
the average loan balance per borrower and the percent of women members. As Figure 2.4
illustrates, as of 2009 the total borrowers of the bank were 7.97 million and 97% of those are
women. This indicates that the number of borrowers has more than doubled since 2002, when the
bank had only 2.08 million members. Similar growth can also be observed in the number of
branches since as of 2009 the bank had 2,562 branches, which is also almost twice the 1,178
branches it had in 2002.
FIGURE 2.4 Grameen Bank’s Outreach Growth, 2002-2009

Source- Grameen Bank
Bank
26

Chen Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. Rep. CGAP, Feb. 2010. Web.
14 July 2010. <http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.42393/FN61.pdf>.
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Loan Portfolio Growth
Finally, since 2002 the Grameen Bank has also seen growth in its loan portfolio. According to
Figure 2.5 below there has been growth in the principal amount of loans disbursed, the number
of loans disbursed, the gross total of loan outstanding, the current performing loans and the
portfolio growth rate.
FIGURE 2.5 Grameen Bank’s Loan Portfolio Growth, 2002-2009

Source- Grameen Bank
Bank

The Grameen Bank’s institutional, outreach and loan portfolio growth since 2002 shows that it
has been successful at creating more opportunities for the rural poor to borrow money across
Bangladesh. By expanding the number of active borrowers, employees, branches, and loans
disbursed, the Grameen Bank has been able to expand access to credit and to include millions

Moreno, 19

more poor people into the financial system. 27 Maintaining such growth in an efficient and
financially viable way, therefore, will be instrumental for supporting the Grameen Bank’s goal to
expand the provision of microfinance across Bangladesh as a poverty alleviation strategy in the
future.

27

Chen Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance.
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Chapter 3: Financial Limitations of the Grameen Bank
Decreasing Loan Recovery Rates and Increasing Delinquency
In addition to its high institutional, outreach and loan portfolio growth one of the most important
financial successes of the Grameen Bank has been its high repayment rate of 98%. The Grameen
Bank has long prided itself on maintaining repayment rates, which are considerably higher than
those of mainstream lenders.
In recent years, however, the accuracy of these figures has been disputed and critics have argued
that the bank’s repayment rate has been declining and is in fact lower than 98%. Pearl and
Phillips, for instance, have criticized the Grameen Bank's financial reporting procedures and
suggested that recent repayment problems are being masked by non-standard accounting
practices. 28 Likewise, Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy at New York
University Jonathan J. Murdoch has also maintained that the percentage of the Grameen Bank’s
current loan portfolio that is actually at risk is greater than has been reported. According to
Murdoch, “Grameen’s repayment rates have never been as good as they have claimed…Because
Grameen has been so well-known, nobody has wanted to risk undermining the reputation of the
idea” 29
Despite such criticisms against the Grameen Bank’s loose accounting standards and slow
disclosure, recent data posted by the Grameen Bank supports criticisms that there has been a
trend towards deteriorating repayment rates and increasing delinquency.

28

Pearl, Daniel, and Michael M. Phillips. "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag."
The Wall Street Journal. 27 Nov. 2001. Web. 20 Apr. 2010.
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/pearl112701.htm>.
29

Pearl, Daniel, and Michael M. Phillips. "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag."
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According to the Grameen Bank’s financial data since 2002:


The percentage of borrowers not repaying their loans on time has increased



Loan collection rates have decreased in the short and long term



Delinquency has increased

Defaulting Borrowers
Figure 3.1 shows an approximate 1.50% increase over the last seven years in the percentage of
outstanding borrowers missing 5 to 9 consecutive loans (1-2 months of weekly installments)
from 0.10% in June 2002 to 1.51% in December 2009.

Figure 3.1: Source- Grameen Bank

Loan Collection Rate
Similarly, as Figure 3.2 illustrates the Grameen Bank has been experiencing recurring difficulties
in collecting its loans particularly since December 2003. According to the graph there has been a
decline in the on-time loan collection rate (% of amounts due actually paid) from nearly 99% in
2003 to the current 96.83%, marking a decrease of 2.17%.
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Figure 3.2: Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag

Short and Long Run Loan Collection Rates
Likewise, when considering longer term difficulties, such as total amounts owed by people who
have not only missed 5-9 consecutive payments but missed 10 or more payments, similar trends
towards declining on-time repayment are evident since 2002.

Figure 3.3: Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag
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In Figure 3.3 the % of amounts due in a month not paid is a non-recovery rate or the inverse of
the values of Figure 3.2 from a collection to a non-collection standpoint; therefore, it shows the
same trend as Figure 3.2 shows of decreasing on-time collection rates since 2002. Likewise, the
two added indicators of the % of amounts outstanding owed by those who have missed 5-9
consecutive payments and 10 or more consecutive payments also show a similar trend towards
decreasing on-time collection rates for longer periods of time.30
Delinquency
Finally, although the definition of repayment rate varies widely over microfinance institutions, in
the microfinance industry 30 days is a common breakpoint marking when a loan becomes
delinquent; hence, Portfolio at Risk (PAR) 30 is considered to be a standard international
measures of portfolio quality since it measures the portion of a portfolio which is deemed at risk
because payments are more than 30 days past due. 31
According to Figure 3.4 there has been a rise in delinquency for the Grameen Bank’s core credit
product, the basic loan, and for its flexible loans since 2002 due to the fact that there has been a
rise in its Portfolio at Risk/30 days (Par 30) levels.

30

"Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." Center for Global Development. 9 Feb.
2010. Web. 20 Mar. 2010. <http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2010/02/grameen-bank-which-pioneered-loans-for-the-poor-hashit-a-repayment-snag.php>.
31

Morduch, Jonathan. "The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank."
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Portfolio at Risk > 30 days delinquent
Grameen Bank, June 2002- February 2010

Figure 3.4: Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag

Although there has been a rise in the Grameen’s PAR 30 levels since 2002, this increase in
PAR30 does not necessarily signal that the Grameen Bank is in a serious repayment crisis. 32 In
fact, a microfinance institution is considered to be in a serious crisis when its PAR 30 is above 5
or 10%.33 This is supported by a study from 2003 to 2008 which shows that “a random MFI of
over US$1 million in assets had a 1–5% chance of failing during a three-year period, an MFI that
reported PAR30 >5% had a 6–10% chance of failure, while one with PAR30 >10% would fail

Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global
Valuation Survey 2010." CGAP, Mar. 2010. Web. 14 June 2010. <http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.42531/>.
32

"Financial Crisis Glossary – a Guide to the Buzzwords of the Crisis." CGAP, 1 Nov. 2008. Web. 15 July 2010.
<http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.11.12053/>.
33
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10–15% of the time.” 34 Hence, since the Grameen Bank’s PAR 30 levels have remained
consistently below the 5% threshold, the recent increase in PAR 30 is currently only a red flag
indicator that a repayment crisis could occur in the future if these levels are permitted to rise
further.
In addition, comparative data also shows that, despite the recent increase in its PAR 30 levels,
the Grameen Bank has also been performing well relative to its main competitors BRAC and
ASA. As Figure 3.5 illustrates since 2004 the Grameen Bank’s PAR 30 levels have been
relatively lower than those of BRAC and ASA.35

Figure 3.5: Source- Mix Market and Grameen Bank

Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global
Valuation Survey 2010."
34

Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global
Valuation Survey 2010."
35
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Although the accuracy of this comparison is ultimately dependent on the accuracy with which
each of these institutions have measured and reported their overdue portfolios, according to
available data from the Grameen Bank and Mix Market, the Grameen Bank’s PAR 30 levels
have remained low relative to its competitors since 2004.36
Finally, the Grameen Bank has also been performing comparably to Syminvest’s 50 major
investible microfinance institutions. As Figure 3.6 shows, much like the Grameen Bank, the
average PAR 30 of the SYM 50 investible microfinance institutions has also not significantly
exceeded the 5% threshold in recent years.37
Portfolio at Risk (PAR) >30, SYM50 Average

Figure 3.6: Source- Syminvest

The Grameen Bank, therefore, is not currently in a serious repayment crisis since its PAR 30
levels are below 5%, they are relatively lower than its main competitors BRAC and ASA and
Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global
Valuation Survey 2010."
36
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they are comparable to the average PAR 30 of the SYM50 investible microfinance institutions.
However, precautions should nevertheless be taken to avoid more serious financial problems in
the future particularly since higher delinquency could make it impossible for the Grameen Bank
to be financially sustainable in the long run.
Possible Causes of the Decreasing Recovery Rates and Increasing Delinquency
To prevent the decreasing recovery rates and increasing delinquency from leading to a serious
repayment crisis in the future it is important to consider possible causes of the recent trends.
Although there are numerous possible explanations, in the following section multiple borrowing,
over borrowing, adverse selection and the economy will be examined in greater detail as possible
contributing factors to the Grameen Bank’s decreasing recovery rates and increasing delinquency
since 2002.
Adverse Selection
The problem of adverse selection arises in microfinance when microfinance institutions are
unable to distinguish between ‘risky’ and ‘safe’ borrowers prior to providing the loans.38 In the
contractual relationship between the Grameen Bank and potential borrowers, therefore, there is
an adverse selection risk because the Grameen Bank is not able to defer to usual measures of risk
assessment, such as collateral or credit ratings to determine whether borrowers are ‘risky’ or
‘safe.’39

38Borge,
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June 2010.
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The group lending structure of the Grameen Bank, however, has diminished the bank’s role in
controlling for such adverse selection problems because it has “triggered a peer selection effect
among borrowers who know each other and often have more information about their peers
because they belong to the same small rural communities.”40 This is the case because since group
lending creates joint liability, it also induces borrowers who have perfect information about each
other to choose partners of the same type.41 Consequently, safe borrowers have formed groups
with other safe borrowers, leaving the risky borrowers to form their own groups.42
Although the Grameen Bank’s group lending structure has reduced the possibility of adverse
selection problems, it is probable that these adverse selection problems have not been fully
corrected as the Grameen Bank has continued to expand. For instance, it is probable that they
have not been completely corrected by the Grameen Bank’s staff since rapid growth typically
requires MFIs to assign staff more quickly into responsible positions, sometimes resulting in less
care being taken in recruitment, training, and preparation. 43 Likewise, it is also probable that
Grameen’s adverse selection problems may not have been completely self-corrected by
borrowers as the number of Grameen borrowers has increased since risky borrowers are more
likely to have joined groups with other borrowers.
As a result, it is possible that while expanding the bank has attracted a greater number of
inherently risky borrowers, such as borrowers who are less driven, more risk seeking, poorly
disciplined, less entrepreneurial or have lower quality projects. This is supported by the fact that
as Figures 3.2 and 2.4 illustrate since 2002 there has been an increase in the number of Grameen
40Borge,
41
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members and employees at the same time that there has also been a decrease in the loan
collection rate. Given this positive correlation, therefore, it is possible that the rise in
delinquency could be related to the fact that the Grameen Bank has been providing loans to
riskier borrowers since 2002.
Concentrated Market Competition and Multiple Borrowing
The rise in delinquency at the Grameen Bank could also be attributed to an increase in multiple
borrowing. The likelihood that clients borrow from more than one MFI has increased due to the
fact that currently over 650 microcreditors operate in Bangladesh. 44 Furthermore, since there is
no national identification system in Bangladesh, creditors have been unable to share information
to track how much debt people are juggling, as creditors in developed countries do through credit
bureaus.45 As a result of this rise in competition and lack of transparency in terms of disbursing
credit, microfinance borrowers have been able to take loans from multiple sources to smooth
their cashflows.
According to Pearl and Phillips, the increasing competition from other microcredit institutions
has not only resulted in a problem with overlapping loans from multiple institutions, but it has
also created pressure for borrowers to maintain greater self-discipline.46 Despite this pressure,
however, they suggest that multiple borrowing has in fact resulted in an erosion of credit
discipline over the past several years because borrowers that have taken multiple loans have
strived to maintain their regular repayment schedule through a process of loan recycling and
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cross-financing, despite not having the ability to repay their loans.47 Moreover, since borrowers
have been able to raise their total borrowings from multiple sources, the Grameen Bank’s
practice of gradually raising loan sizes to ensure borrowers remain within their repayment limits
has become less useful as a risk management tool.48 Instead, by taking on debt from multiple
sources, borrowers have increased their liability and the risk of becoming trapped in a cycle of
debt.
Moreover, the increased competition and multiple borrowing observed in recent years has also
created pressure for the Grameen Bank to remain competitive and to impose effective discipline
on borrowers. However, since borrowers have been able to access loans from several MFIs or
alternate between loans, they have become less dependent on the Grameen Bank and thus less
constrained by its loan repayment schedules. Consequently, they have been able to default and
still retain their borrowing relationship with other MFIs and this has in turn diminished their
incentive to repay and made late payments more likely.49
Another possible explanation for the decreasing loan collection rate, therefore, could also be the
fact that Bangladeshis are currently juggling loans from several microcreditors at once and/or
borrowing more money than they can repay. If this is the case, in the future it will be critical to
establish a credit bureau in order to improve credit risk management and prevent a more
expansive erosion of credit discipline.50
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Over Borrowing
Similarly, it is also possible that the increasing delinquency and percentage of borrowers
defaulting can be due to the fact that borrowers are currently borrowing larger total amounts
from the Grameen Bank than they can repay. As illustrated by the Figure 4.2 the amount of
outstanding credit per Grameen Bank member has increased from 5160 taka in 2002 to
approximately 7300 taka in 2010, which is also the same time period during in which the rise in
delinquency took place:

Figure 3.7: Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag

This increase in total amount borrowed therefore makes it more likely that some clients are
borrowing amounts beyond their means.51 Given the fact that there is also a positive correlation
between the rise in delinquency by Grameen borrowers and the increase in outstanding credit per
51
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Grameen Bank member, therefore, over borrowing could also be another possible explanation for
the recent rise in delinquency and decline in repayment rates since 2002.
Economy of Bangladesh
Finally, it is also possible that the economy of Bangladesh and the effects of the global financial
crisis have indirectly inhibited Grameen member’s ability to repay their loans since there was a
peak in delinquency during 2008 and 2009. According to macroeconomic indicators for the fiscal
years of 2008 and 2009, however, problems in the economy did not cause the rise in delinquency
because macroeconomic data shows that the economy of Bangladesh weathered the global
economic crisis well and that instead it has been growing during the past years. In fact, in FY09
annual GDP growth still reached a healthy 5.9% GDP growth because limited integration with
the world economy helped shield Bangladesh from the negative effects of the global economic
crisis.52
Annual Real GDP Growth (%)

Figure 3.8: Source- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
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Furthermore, although annual GDP growth in FY09 decelerated slightly from the 6.2% growth in
FY08, the 5.9% GDP growth in FY09 was nevertheless considerably higher than in FY02 when
GDP growth was approximately 4%.53 This is important because it shows that there has been
healthy economic growth in Bangladesh during 2002-2008, the same years that delinquency has
increased at the Grameen Bank. Hence, it is likely that external macroeconomic factors did not
directly contribute to the recent rise in delinquency and decline in repayment rates since 2002.
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Chapter 4: Social Successes and Limitations of the Grameen Bank
In terms of social standards the Grameen Bank has also had significant successes and limitations.
Sixteen Decisions
Beginning in 1984, the Sixteen Decisions was introduced by the Grameen Bank as a social
development program “to imbue members with discipline, unity and hard work to improve their
living standards.”54 The Grameen Bank developed the Sixteen Decisions in order to promote
social and financial discipline among the rural poor.55 At every branch of Grameen Bank the
borrowers recite the Sixteen Decisions and they pledge to follow them. As illustrated by Figure
4.1 these decisions include certain codes of conduct that members are encouraged to follow in
their daily life, such as the production of fruits and vegetables in kitchen gardens, investment for
improvement of housing and education of children, use of latrines and safe drinking water for
better health, and rejection of dowry in marriages.56
According to the Grameen Bank, the implementation of the Sixteen Decisions has been
successful because it has encouraged Grameen borrowers to adopt positive social habits. For
instance, the Grameen Bank states that since the Sixteen Decisions were implemented almost all
Grameen borrowers have their school-age children enrolled in regular classes and this in turn has
helped bring about social change and educate the next generation.
Figure 4.1 presents a list of the Grameen Bank’s Sixteen Decisions.
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Sixteen Decisions of the Grameen Bank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen Bank:
Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard work – in all walks of our lives.
Prosperity we shall bring to our families.
We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses and work
towards constructing new houses at the earliest.
We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them
and sell the surplus.
During the plantation seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible.
We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our
expenditures. We shall look after our health.
We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for their
education.
We shall always keep our children and the environment clean.
We shall build and use pit-latrines.
We shall drink water from tube wells. If it is not available, we shall boil
water or use alum.
We shall not take any dowry at our sons' weddings; neither shall we give
any dowry at our daughter's wedding. We shall keep our centre free from
the curse of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage.
We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone; neither shall we allow anyone
to do so.
We shall collectively undertake bigger investments for higher incomes.
We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in difficulty, we
shall all help him or her.
If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any centre, we shall all go
there and help restore discipline.
We shall take part in all social activities collectively.

Figure 4.1: Source- Grameen Bank

Limitations
Despite claims by proponents about the benefits of the Sixteen Decisions, however, opponents of
this policy claim that it forces families and borrowers to abide by the rules and regulations set
forth by the bank. Furthermore, some have gone as far as to say that the mandatory changes in
lifestyle that the Grameen Bank imposes through the Sixteen Decisions “are tantamount to a
cult’s demands.” 57
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Lending to Women
Historically, women have been neglected by development projects and removed from the growth
and development process. 58 The Grameen Bank, however, has actively promoted their
membership and deliberately targeted women, recognizing that “their participation in social
development is necessary for economic development because of their primary role in providing
health, education and nutrition to the family members.”59
By providing women with access to credit the Grameen Bank has helped women to initiate
income-earning activities, marking a significant step towards promoting equity between men and
women and establishing gender justice. 60 Moreover, as a consequence of their increased
economic opportunities, women have been able to gain authority and respect from their spouses
and communities. 61 Lending to them, therefore, has not only had positive effects on their
economic participation and earnings, but it has also had a positive effect on their marital
decision-making power and their ability to no longer be financially powerless in their families
and communities 62
In addition, the Grameen Bank has also helped poor women acquire self-esteem by promoting
entrepreneurialism. Their extra income has also brought about better living conditions for other
family members, especially their children.63 In fact, women are now able to “take a more active
role in their children’s futures by providing their children with better educational opportunities
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and conveying a positive image about women to their daughters.” 64 Hence, advocates of the
Grameen Bank suggest that it has promoted social justice by redressing Bangladesh’s history of
depriving women access to credit and empowering poor people who had previously been
disfranchised.65

Limitations
Contrary to claims about the role of the Grameen Bank in promoting social justice and
empowerment, critics view the Grameen Bank’s policies and services as disempowering to
women. They claim that since the Grameen Bank targets its loans to women, some husbands
who have been excluded, have forced their wives to sign up for loans, only to appropriate the
funds from them.66 They suggest that most women borrowers are not the direct benefactors of the
credit extended to them, but instead they “are mediators between male household members and
the bank.”67 Hence, they indicate that the provision of loans to women does not empower them
because “the lending mechanism can operate under the prevailing patriarchal norms of the
village society and the positional vulnerability of women.”68 Instead, they contend that rather
than empowering women, the Grameen Bank has inaugurated, ‘‘new forms of domination over
women in society’69

64

Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.12

65

Selinger, Evan. Does Microcredit ‘‘Empower’’? Reﬂections on the Grameen Bank Debate. pg 28

66

Morduch, Jonathan. "The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank." p.6.

67

Morduch, Jonathan. "The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank." p.6.

68

Morduch, Jonathan. "The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank." p.6.

69

Morduch, Jonathan. "The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank." p.6.

Moreno, 38

Other Social Effects
Finally, according to numerous studies, the following are several other social effects that the
Grameen Bank has had on its borrowers, their families and rural villages in Bangladesh.
• Higher Incomes- The incomes of Grameen members are approximately 43% higher than
incomes of control groups in nonprogram villages and 28% higher than nonmembers in Grameen
villages. Grameen members are also able to rely more on savings and their own funds to cope
with crises rather than to borrow from moneylenders.70
• Household consumption- Female clients have increased household consumption by 18 takas for
every 100 takas borrowed.71
•Children Education- The children of Grameen borrowers compared to children of non-members
show higher levels of schooling. For instance, almost all girls in Grameen households have had
some schooling, compared to 60% of girls in non-client households. Furthermore, the schooling
rate is significantly higher for boys given that 81% of boys in client households have received
some schooling, compared to 54% in non-client households.72
•Contraception- Grameen clients show a higher rate of contraceptive use (59%) than non-clients
(43%). This has been attributed to clients’ increased awareness of contraceptive programs.73
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•Environment- Grameen Shakti is a non-profit company, part of the Grameen family, which has
distributed clean energy products in remote areas of Bangladesh. As of December 2006, it has
installed 77,000 solar home systems and 500 biogas plants.74
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Conclusion: The Grameen Bank and the Microfinance Movement
Since the Grameen Bank was established in 1976 it has demonstrated the potential of
microfinance as an important liberating force and instrument in the struggle against poverty. By
expanding access to credit to poor households across rural Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank has
rejected the basic methodology of conventional banking and developed a paradigm using rules of
lending that are tailored to help the rural poor. Furthermore, despite its limitations, the Grameen
Bank has defied its critic’s expectations and proven to be a financially and socially successful
institution.
From a financial standpoint, the Grameen Bank has successfully experienced high institutional,
outreach and loan portfolio growth since 2002. By expanding the number of active borrowers,
employees, branches, and loans disbursed it has been able to increase access to credit across rural
Bangladesh, to include millions more poor people into the financial system and to create more
self-employment opportunities for them.75 Furthermore, although there has been a decrease in the
Grameen Bank’s recovery rates and increase in delinquency since 2002, according to its PAR 30
levels, the standard international measure of portfolio at risk, currently the Grameen Bank is not
in a serious repayment crisis. Rather, it is performing comparably to the SYM50 investible
microfinance institutions and relatively better than its main competitors BRAC and ASA.
From a social impact standpoint, the Grameen Bank has also been successful. Although
criticisms have emerged that the bank’s growth has contributed to the recent rise in delinquency,
even if this is the case the benefits of helping a larger number of poor borrowers have
outweighed the costs of higher delinquency particularly since the bank’s provision of credit has
had significant social benefits for its borrowers. For instance, by providing women with access to
75
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credit, the Grameen Bank has helped women initiate income-earning activities, become
financially independent and gain authority and respect from their spouses and communities; thus
marking a significant step towards establishing gender justice. In addition, by providing the rural
poor with an opportunity to invest in self-employment microenterprise actives, it has also helped
borrowers reduce their vulnerability to crises and become empowered. Likewise, other important
social effects include higher incomes, higher household consumption, increased children
education, greater contraception use, among others.
Finally, in addition to being socially and financially successful as an institution, the Grameen
Bank has also been successful as a key figure that has led to the emergence and development of
the microfinance movement. Although Grameen-like microfinance may not be a panacea for
global poverty alleviation, given its limitations, the success of the Grameen Bank has
nevertheless demonstrated that microfinance can be an effective development tool. As a result, in
recent years microfinance has emerged as a new approach to poverty alleviation and social
change, it has gained widespread international recognition and it has been incorporated into
mainstream development agendas. Ultimately, therefore, the Grameen Bank’s success has not
only extended to its work as an independent microfinance institution, but also as the founder of
the microfinance movement, which has significantly improved the lives of millions of poor
people over the past three decades and changed the development discourse around the world.
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